


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WEEKLY SUMMARY



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SECRET**H I G H L I G H T S**

While rumors circulated in Berlin during the past week that the USSR intends shortly to lift the blockade, Soviet representatives at Lake Success continued to use the UN General Assembly as a forum before which to attack US "imperialist" policies. In branding the Atlantic Pact as a warlike move which undermines the prestige of the UN, the Soviet delegates were furthering the current propaganda effort to picture the USSR as the preserver of world peace and main bulwark of the UN (see page 2). A Soviet offer to lift the Berlin blockade, if made in the near future as part of an over-all "peace offer," would be entirely consistent with the current propaganda line. Moreover, though little or no concrete evidence exists to support the rumors, it must seem self-evident to the Kremlin that if the USSR is to regain the initiative in Germany, the Berlin blockade will have to be lifted (see page 4).

Israeli representatives made it clear during the past week that Israel intends to ignore UN direction on the remaining key issues involved in a general settlement in Palestine (see page 9). Israeli representatives not only made evident their determination to hold on to New Jerusalem but also informed the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission that Israel does not plan to accept internationalization of Jerusalem or to yield ground on either the Arab refugee problem or the question of boundaries.

In resuming full-scale military operations in China's civil war, the Communists apparently intend to capture the entire Yangtze valley, with the possible exception of Shanghai which may be by-passed for the time being (see page 11). This phase of the campaign will probably last from two to four months. In Indonesia, meanwhile, direct discussions at Batavia between the Dutch and Republicans have begun in an atmosphere of surprising cordiality (see page 14).

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SECRET**UNITED NATIONS**

General Assembly The spotlight in the cold war wavered briefly this week on Berlin where rumors circulated about an impending Soviet move to lift the blockade (see page 4) and on Paris where the Communist-dominated peace rally opened on 20 April. In the main, however, the spotlight focused on New York, where the delegates to the current session of the UN General Assembly attempted to cope with Soviet efforts to use the Assembly as a forum to attack the "imperialist" designs of the US. The Soviet Union finally delivered its long-expected attack on the Atlantic Pact, branding it as a warlike move which undermines the prestige and power of the UN. This attack was only one expression of the over-all Soviet propaganda effort to picture the USSR as the preserver of world peace and the bulwark of the UN, a type of propaganda which may cause some non-Communists to doubt the sincerity of US profession of support for the UN. However, the hollowness of the Soviet position as defender of the UN was demonstrated by Soviet opposition to the recommendations approved by the Assembly for limiting the use of the veto in the Security Council. The Soviet argument in favor of the veto clearly revealed that the Atlantic Pact actually had in part been made necessary by continued Soviet misuse of the veto power. Meanwhile, the numerically strong Latin American and Arab blocs are exploring the possibility of a behind-the-scenes agreement on multilateral trusteeship for Libya. Should these groups agree on some such formula, its chances of gaining GA approval will be measurably improved. Unless Israel modifies its truculent attitude, this session of the Assembly will probably not recommend Israel's admission to the UN (see page 10).

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SECRET**W E S T E R N E U R O P E**

Satellite Containment Despite a US desire for strict application of the US-UK policy for containment of Satellite air expansion in Western Europe, the UK continues to interpret the policy loosely and has suggested a US-UK meeting to discuss the question. Unless the UK revises its policy, the chances of enlisting the full support of other Western European nations may be impaired. Although the Netherlands, Belgium, and France have indicated their acceptance of the US-UK air policy "in principal," they have not yet agreed to any specific commitments for implementing the policy. The British attitude may result, in part, from a belief that under certain circumstances the advantage of penetrating the iron curtain by air outweighs the disadvantages of permitting certain Soviet-controlled flights into the western areas. The Dutch and Belgians feel that the US and the UK, by refusing to grant Satellite air carriers transit rights over western Germany, are capable of blocking Satellite flights and should be willing to accept sole responsibility for doing so. Although the US has accepted this responsibility and has denied Satellite requests for overflight rights, the UK recently authorized a Hungarian carrier to make a single special flight over the British zone enroute to Amsterdam. In addition, the UK is unwilling to support the US in urging Belgium to cancel its already informally approved agreement with Poland for reciprocal flights between the two countries.

GERMANY

Soviet Tactics Soviet tactics in Germany continue to suggest that although Soviet control of all Germany undoubtedly remains the maximum objective, the Kremlin has decided that a "neutral" Germany, prevented from making a

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SECRET**GERMANY**

firm alignment with the West, is a more feasible goal for the immediate future. The Kremlin may reason that the traditional tendency of German commerce to look eastward for markets and raw materials will bring Germany under eventual Soviet domination.

Meanwhile, rumors have been active recently that the Soviet Union will soon lift the Berlin blockade. Although there has been little or no concrete evidence to support such rumors, it must seem self-evident to the Kremlin that if the USSR is to regain the initiative and if the Soviet campaign for "German unity" is to have any appreciable success among the German people, the Berlin blockade will have to be lifted. Any such Soviet offer, if made now, would certainly be part of an over-all "peace offer" and probably would be made in such a way as to camouflage the Soviet defeat on the blockade. The current Paris "peace congress" would seem to provide an ideal setting for such a Soviet offer, but there is no evidence that Soviet strategy has changed enough to permit an offer on Germany actually acceptable to the western powers.

Coal Shortage Although Ruhr coal production was greater during March than at any other time since the war, a shortage of coal for German industry appears imminent. In an effort to cash in on the high prices being paid for manufactured goods, most industries in the Bizone have used up their reserve stocks of coal. Thus, western German industry, except for iron and steel, may be forced to curtail production programs to correspond with current coal allotments. The Germans have long complained that the fixed price for Ruhr coal should be increased to the world price level, which is now \$2 to \$3 per ton higher, thus permitting increased coal allocations for domestic industries.

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SPAIN

Economic Policy The seriousness of Spain's economic plight will probably force Franco to attempt to make those changes in Spanish economic policy requisite to receiving a loan from the Export Import Bank and to satisfy the Bank that Spain can repay a loan. Because the change will be opposed by many powerful interests that support the Franco regime, however, Franco will move slowly in implementing the recommended reforms, which include adoption of a realistic and single peseta exchange rate, easing of restrictions on foreign capital, and reduction of the scope and function of the National Institute of Industry. Meanwhile, the Minister of Industry and Commerce has informally expressed a willingness to undertake reforms, and rumors of imminent changes in economic policy are current in Madrid. Despite this apparent willingness to meet US demands, however, the Franco regime will have difficulty in demonstrating its ability to repay a loan, principally because Spain's present economic difficulties are largely the result of the regime's previous inept economic policy.

UNITED KINGDOM

Labor Unrest As the result of the newly-announced 1949-50 budget for the UK, leaders of the British Trades Union Congress (TUC) appear to doubt their ability to prevent widespread demands for further wage increases and some subsequent strike action if these demands are denied. The budget contained none of the anticipated reliefs from heavy taxation, and in fact provided for a small increase in the cost of essential foods. Because the government may be expected to continue to adhere closely to its hold-the-wage-

SECRET**UNITED KINGDOM**

line policy, some increase in industrial disputes and unrest is likely. Labor's realization, however, that a defeat of the Labor Government will mean the return of the Conservatives will probably prevent strikes from reaching serious proportions.

SWEDEN

Reduced Exports Swedish exports of pulp and paper products, already substantially curtailed owing to Sweden's inability to compete successfully in the US market, are further threatened by the use of ECA funds by Italy and the Bizone for cheaper US and Canadian products. The Swedes argue that this action violates ECA's goal of promoting intra-European trade, and Swedish Communists are able to point to this development as proof of their claim that the European recovery program is designed to bolster the US economy at the expense of Europe's. Regardless of these claims, however, it is doubtful that Sweden can fully recapture its prewar markets, particularly in the US, in view of lower production costs and export surpluses in the US and Canada. (Swedish exports to the US in 1949 will probably not exceed 250,000 tons as compared with the prewar average of 800,000 to 1,000,000 tons.) Despite the importance of Swedish pulp and paper exports (which with other forest products normally constitute 50% of all exports) to Sweden's economy, the Swedes are presently unwilling to take such remedial steps as devaluation of the krona or a reduction in prices which might produce a similar cut in US and Canadian prices. It appears more likely that Sweden will be forced to reduce its imports from hard currency countries and to revise its program under ECA.

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SECRET**E A S T E R N E U R O P E****BULGARIA**

Dimitrov's Removal Although his deteriorating health may have been a consideration, the recent surrender of office by Georgi Dimitrov, Bulgarian Premier and Communist leader, is probably more closely linked to the expulsion of economic planner Traicho Kostov and the subsequent purge of the Government and Party (see page 18). Kremlin dissatisfaction both with the performance of the Bulgarian Communist Party and Dimitrov's occasional tendency toward independent thought probably contributed directly to Dimitrov's retirement. If Dimitrov's health were the only factor involved, his departure to the USSR would hardly have been publicized at a time when the Bulgarian Government was already weakened by internal dissension. Under Dimitrov's leadership the Bulgarian Communist Party apparently developed unsuspected nationalist tendencies. Moscow may have become aware of the situation through Kostov's resistance to Soviet domination and may have ordered a rapid reorganization of the Bulgarian Communist Party. The nominal accession to the premiership of Vasil Kolarov, who lacks any real Party following, may be explained by the need for the temporary appointment of a person incapable of resisting Moscow dictates.

ALBANIA

Role as Satellite Despite Soviet attempts to strengthen Albania following the defection of Tito and the increasingly important role assigned to Albania in supplying the Greek guerrillas and resisting Tito, isolated Albania will probably

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ALBANIA

remain one of the weakest of the Soviet Satellites. The gradual build-up of Albania into a full-fledged Satellite began in late 1948 with a purge of the nationalistic elements in the Albanian government. Then, as a Kremlin favorite free from Yugoslav influence, Albania signed trade agreements with Rumania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. More recently, a number of actions underlined the Kremlin's determination to strengthen Albania. An unusually ostentatious reception was given the Albanian delegation which went to Moscow to sign a trade agreement, and Albania was belatedly brought into the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance. However, it is still difficult to determine if these Soviet actions have accomplished anything more than to enable Albania to continue resisting increasing pressure from Tito and to serve as a Soviet supply base for the Greek guerrillas.

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SECRET**NEAR EAST - AFRICA****PALESTINE**

Peace Goals Israel, which has not taken pains to soothe UN sensibilities in the past, made clear last week that it intends to write its own final peace settlement with the Arab states and will make no special effort to obtain prior approval of the UN or the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC). Israel's intention to hold New Jerusalem was underlined by a Jewish Agency announcement of plans for doubling the city's 100,000 Jewish population in the next five years. At the same time, Israeli representatives bluntly informed the PCC that Israel does not plan either to accept internationalization of Jerusalem or to yield ground on the other two major issues involved in a peace settlement: the refugee problem and the question of boundaries. The representatives indicated that the Israeli Government: (1) is unable to accept repatriation of any substantial numbers of Arab refugees in view of the present influx of Jewish immigrants; (2) is not prepared to give up any territory now held and would even ask for additional territory if Arab Palestine were to fall to Transjordan; and (3) counts on "changing Washington's mind" on the US "territorial compensation" formula for preserving the general lines of the 1947 partition scheme.

Reaction to UN The Israelis are doubtless concerned over the UN General Assembly's decision to postpone a vote on Israel's application for UN membership and by the Pope's Good Friday appeal for internationalization of Jerusalem and other Holy Places. However, Israel is unlikely to abandon its basic premise that the UN is unwilling to accept the financial and military responsibility of intervening actively in Palestine. Convinced that they have a good chance of obtaining

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SECRET**PALESTINE**

the settlement they want from the Arabs, the Israelis are evidently willing to gamble on obtaining the UN's acquiescence afterwards. In the case of Jerusalem, they probably plan to divide up the city with Transjordan in such a manner as to provide special international rights (or actual UN control) for the Christian shrines, most of which are in the Arab Old City. Regarding other territorial matters and the refugee problem, Israel probably believes that interested outside powers will not be in a position to object to Israel's terms once they have been accepted by the Arabs, whose interests are directly affected. In the end, although Israel's brusqueness might cost it admission to the UN at this session of the General Assembly, the Israelis would obtain the settlement they want and could then resubmit their application when the General Assembly reconvenes next fall.

IRAN

Soviet Relations Soviet Ambassador Sadchikov's sudden departure for Moscow on 15 April, although probably for routine consultation, emphasizes the present unsettled state of Soviet-Iranian relations. The USSR is believed to be concerned at this time over the possibility that Iran will formally notify the Security Council of recent menacing Soviet acts. Such an Iranian move would jeopardize the Kremlin's current propaganda attempts in the UN and elsewhere to picture the USSR as the principal proponent of peace. Other outstanding Soviet-Iranian problems include: (1) the reported Iranian request for precise determination of the Soviet-Iranian border east of the Caspian Sea; (2) the changes in Soviet operations in Iran necessitated by the closing of the Soviet consulates there; and (3) the validity of Article VI of the 1921 treaty between the two nations, which furnishes a basis for Soviet intervention in Iran.

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SECRET**F A R E A S T****CHINA**

Military Mission After months of idleness and futile peace maneuvers, the Chinese Communists have once again resumed the offensive. Communist forces numbering approximately 500,000 to 700,000 have launched an offensive along a 400-mile front from the Anking sector to Kiangyin and have successfully crossed the Yangtze in force in several places. The Communists are opposed by an estimated 450-500,000 Nationalist troops.

The immediate Communist mission, which will probably require from two to four months to achieve, appears to be the capture or "liberation" of the entire Yangtze valley, specifically, the cities of Nanking, Hankow, Changsha, Nanchang, and Hangchow. Although Shanghai may be captured, it is more probable that for the present it will be merely isolated. The Communists may try to make a deal (similar to that concluded with Fu Tso-yi in Peiping) with Pai Chung-hsi, who controls approximately 150,000 troops in the Hankow area. Pai, however, probably will withdraw south into Kwangsi. On the other hand, every effort will probably be made to destroy the Nationalist forces of Tang En-po (approximately 350,000) in the Shanghai-Nanking-Wuhu sectors, because Tang is a Chiang Kai-shek man and his troops are the only remaining sizeable, effective force loyal to Chiang. Chiang, therefore, will probably withdraw these troops south rather than sacrifice them in a futile defense of the Shanghai-Nanking area.

Nationalist Reaction Confronted with the Communist military advance, Nationalist leaders in Nanking generally will withdraw to South China rather than accede to Communist terms and attempt to associate themselves with

SECRET**CHINA**

a new Communist regime. Acting President Li's position will be weakened by the failure of his peace effort. There will be increasing clamor, particularly on the part of those South China Nationalists who never sincerely supported peace negotiations, for the public return to active leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. He is still the person most capable of holding together Kuomintang and Nationalist leaders. Thus, a reorganized Nationalist Government, directed actually if not openly by Chiang Kai-shek, will probably operate chiefly from Taiwan, Canton, and the southeast coastal area of China. It will have at best only nominal control of the western provinces where local leaders, protected by distance and topography, may be able to escape Communist control for a long period.

Communist Problem As the Communists gain military control of the Yangtze valley, they will be facing political problems more numerous and complicated than those encountered in North China. They may, therefore, defer for some time an actual occupation of Shanghai. During the next few months they may be expected to organize a national government, which will be proclaimed as a "coalition" of Communist and "democratic" elements.

US Position The coming months will provide a crucial testing period for US relations with the new China. In dealing with Communist officials, the US Embassy in Nanking will be confronted with problems similar to those encountered by US Consuls General in Mukden, Tientsin, and Peiping. As in Peiping, the Communists will probably permit the Embassy to maintain communication with the outside world, but the Embassy will be hampered in its contacts with the Communists because Peiping will in all likelihood remain the political center of Communist China. In addition, the US position will be complicated by the


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SECRET**CHINA**

issue of whether or not to recognize the new government which the Communists will probably establish. Moreover, Communist control of the lower Yangtze valley, particularly when that control is extended to Shanghai, will affect the largest concentration in China of US nationals and property interests and will genuinely test whether or not it is possible for foreigners to do business with the Chinese Communists and, if so, on what terms.

Communist Economy With the major victory in the Chinese civil conflict already achieved, the Chinese Communists are now shifting their attention to the long-range problem of creating an industrial China. Last month, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party announced its decision to shift the base of Party work from the rural areas to the cities, in order to concentrate on the rehabilitation and development of urban industry. More recently, Jen Pi-shih, the leading economist of the Chinese Communist Party, publicly announced that the goals of the industrialization program are: (1) a strong national defense establishment; (2) economic independence; (3) a higher standard of living; and (4) a strong foundation for the "future change to socialism." As a means of achieving these goals and at the same time consolidating its control over China, the Chinese Communist Party has decided upon a program for the rapid development of state-owned industry and the establishment of state controls which will assure the channeling of agricultural production for urban and industrial use. Although Jen made unwarranted claims for the speed with which the Communists can industrialize China, his speech demonstrates the Communist belief that the "long march to economic victory" has begun and that state-controlled industries are essential to final success.

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INDONESIA

With prospects for eventual settlement of the Indonesian dispute better than at any time since the Security Council's resolution of 28 January 1949, Dutch and Republican delegates at Batavia are holding direct discussions for the first time since May 1948. Meanwhile, Dutch military units are apparently increasing their operations against remnants of the Republican Army.

Talks Continue Although the outcome of the talks at Batavia is still in doubt, conversations have begun in an atmosphere of surprising cordiality. Concessions from both sides, however, will be necessary in order to reach agreement on the major problems on the agenda which include:

- (1) restoration of a Republican government at Jogjakarta;**
- (2) cessation of Dutch and Republican military operations; and**
- (3) determination of the date and conditions of a proposed round-table conference at The Hague. The principal issue of these discussions remains the extent to which the Dutch will accede to Republican demands for the complete withdrawal of Dutch military forces from the Jogjakarta area.**

Military Activity While talks continue at Batavia, Dutch commandos have moved north from Bandoeng for action against units of the crack Siliwangi Division which have ignored a Dutch military ultimatum to cease fighting and join the Dutch forces. Even before the expiration of the ultimatum deadline, Dutch commandos reportedly infiltrated one Republican battalion and killed the commander. Dutch forces have also been active in other areas. From 8 through 10 April, Dutch ground troops and bombers engaged 4,000 Republican troops southwest of Jogjakarta, with the Republicans suffering approximately 1,500 casualties. The fact that these Dutch military actions occurred immediately

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INDONESIA

before the Batavia discussions highlights another problem which the Dutch officials at The Hague must solve before they can implement any agreement with the Republicans. The commander of the Dutch forces in Indonesia and the High Representative of the Crown have consistently represented a reactionary and conservative element of Dutch political opinion. Therefore, both the military leader and the Crown representative will have to be either replaced or brought into line before any over-all settlement can be achieved.

AUSTRALIA

Communist Influence Communist capabilities for industrial sabotage in Australia, which reached considerable proportions during the recent war, will be materially reduced if anti-Communist activity there continues to be effective. Anti-Communists are concentrating their efforts on undermining Communist influence in the trade unions and the government. Although the Labor Government continues to maintain its traditional policy of non-intervention in the affairs of the Communist Party, it has taken important steps to improve its internal security agency and to screen government employees in sensitive positions. In addition, the Government recently indicted the Secretary-General of the Communist Party for sedition. Within the trade unions, many Communists are being removed from key posts. The non-Communist executive body of the Australian Trade Union Council is strengthening anti-Communist factions within its own union affiliates, and some unions, such as the Public Service Clerical Association, have banned Communists from all official positions.

SECRET**WESTERN HEMISPHERE**

ILO Conference The probable interjection of several controversial political issues on the agenda of the International Labor Organization (ILO) Conference, which begins on 25 April in Montevideo, may impair US security interests by weakening hemisphere solidarity. These unscheduled topics include: military juntas, racial discrimination, and Peronism. The hostility of labor groups to military juntas may be aired if the credentials of worker delegates from Peru or Venezuela are challenged. Even if Peru and Venezuela do not send labor delegates to the Conference, the military junta issue may be broached. The problem of racial discrimination in the Canal Zone may also come up and would provide anti-US elements with convenient propaganda material. Because Argentina is planning to send a large delegation to the Conference, probably well prepared to air Peron's labor views, the formation of an anti-Peron bloc can be expected. Acrimonious debate on any of the above issues could easily disrupt consideration of the purely technical problems to which the Conference's agenda is presently committed.

COLOMBIA

Economic Troubles Colombia's economic situation has deteriorated sharply in recent weeks. Foreign exchange reserves declined from \$84 to \$66 million during the first quarter of 1949 chiefly as a result of: (1) excessive licensing of imports for industrial expansion; (2) decreased dollar expenditures by oil companies within the country; and (3) decreased private, foreign investment. Recent declines in wholesale and retail prices are additional indications of

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COLOMBIA

economic maladjustment and reflect the anxiety with which Colombians view the current situation. The drop in the world price of coffee is also a threat to the Colombian economy. Long-range prospects for this key Colombian industry are favorable: the industry is basically sound, and world consumption is running far ahead of production. However, if world coffee prices should continue to fall for even six months, Colombia's economy would suffer serious consequences.

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SECRET**SATELLITE COMMUNIST PURGES**

The recent purges of high-level Communist officials in Bulgaria indicate that Kremlin efforts to establish reliable Communist leadership in the Satellites are meeting with increasing difficulties. In attempting to eradicate Satellite "nationalism," the Kremlin is confronted with two almost equally unpleasant alternatives, neither of which can be wholly successful. If the USSR continues its liquidation of old-line Satellite Communists, the morale and cohesion of the local Communist parties, as well as their control over the Eastern European countries, may be jeopardized. If the Kremlin chooses the other alternative and relaxes its control over the Satellite governments and Party leaders, it runs the risk of further defections like Tito's. Neither course of action will make it any easier for Satellite Communists to perform the nearly impossible task of justifying Moscow's ruthless exploitation of Eastern European resources or increase Satellite dependability in the event of hostilities.

Since Tito's defection last summer, purges of high-level Communist personnel have occurred in Poland, Albania, guerrilla Greece, and, most recently, in Bulgaria. Meanwhile, recurring reports from practically all of the Satellites also indicate continued nationalist dissensions within the ranks of the various Communist parties. In many instances, reports regarding as yet unpurged nationalist leaders within the Satellite parties reveal that the existence of these schisms is common knowledge. The "deviationists" are usually officials connected with economic planning who can see most clearly the pattern of Moscow's ruthless exploitation of the Satellites. In the face of resurgent nationalism among the Satellites and increasing prosperity in Western Europe, the

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Kremlin cannot afford the risk of relaxing its grip over the Communist parties in Eastern Europe. Thus, the Kremlin will probably be forced to use even more brutal state-police methods in retaining and consolidating its control over the Satellites, even though such methods are not a basic cure for nationalist deviation.

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SECRET**REACTION TO SYRIAN COUP**

Colonel Zaim's coup in Syria, which might have been expected to arouse political passion and violence, has instead proved to be one of the dullest revolutions in recorded history. The complete absence of any opposition to Zaim would seem to indicate that the population at large has few regrets over the ouster of President Quwatli and his entourage. At the same time, however, Zaim has been unable, after almost three weeks in power, to obtain the support of a single Syrian political leader of any stature, with the possible exception of Foreign Minister Adel Arslan. After several lesser men proved unwilling or unable to form a government, Zaim was forced to do the job himself, personally assuming the posts of Prime Minister, Minister of Interior, and Minister of Defense.

Meanwhile, although the major powers, as well as the Arab states, are expected to recognize the Zaim regime within a few days, the external reaction to Zaim's assumption of power has been almost equally listless. "Greater Syria" rumors have inevitably sprung up, and the Iraqi Prime Minister has reportedly discussed an Iraqi-Syrian military alliance with Zaim during his recent visit to Damascus. However, both Iraq and its ally Transjordan are probably too burdened with their own problems to wish to become involved in Syrian matters at present, and Zaim will probably shy away from close ties with his stronger Hashimite neighbors while he still has hopes of becoming Syria's Mustapha Kemal.

The apathy which has greeted Zaim's appearance may ultimately prove the undoing of his grandiose schemes for re-vitalizing Syria. Aside from his obvious inexperience in politics, Zaim is apparently not prepared to risk subverting the constitution

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in order to retain power. Moreover, by deciding to deal with Israel, Zaim has discarded one obvious means of whipping up popular support. Vacillation over the Tapline and the French monetary agreements is further evidence that Zaim's regime may well become as colorless and ineffective as the one it replaced.

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SECRET**DISTRIBUTION**

1. The President
- 2,64. Secretary of State
- 3,4. Secretary of Defense
5. Secretary of the Army
6. Secretary of the Navy
7. Secretary of the Air Force
- 8,70. Chairman, National Security Resources Board
9. Executive Secretary, National Security Council
10. Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air
- 11,69. Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
- 12,13,14. Chief of Naval Operations
- 15,16,17. Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
18. Director of Plans and Operations, General Staff, U.S. Army
19. Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations) U.S. Air Force
20. Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations)
21. Director of Plans and Operations, U.S. Air Force
- 22,23,24. Special Assistant to Secretary of State for Research
and Intelligence
- 25,26,27,28,29, 30,31,32,33,34. Director of Intelligence, General Staff, U.S. Army
- 35,36,37,38,39, 40,41,42,43,44. Chief of Naval Intelligence
- 45,46,47,48,49. Director of Intelligence, U.S. Air Force
50. Director of Security and Intelligence, Atomic Energy Comm.
51. Executive Secretary, Military Liaison Committee,
Atomic Energy Commission
- 52,53,54,55,56. Chief, Acquisition & Distribution Division, OCD, Dept. State
57. Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
58. Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
59. Chief, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
60. Secretary of State (Attention: Chief, Policy Reports Staff)
61. Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff
- 62,63. Secretary, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff
65. US Air Force Representative on Joint Strategic
Survey Committee
- 66,67. Secretary, State-Army-Navy-Air Coordinating Committee
68. Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration

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